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620 F.2d 1159 (1980)
Ammoneta SEQUOYAH, Richard Crowe, Gilliam Jackson,
Individually and representing other Cherokee Indians
similarly situated; the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians;
and the United Ketooah Band of Cherokee Indians,
Appellants,
v.
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, Appellee.
No. 79-1633.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued February 14, 1980.
Decided April 15, 1980.
*1160 Robert M. Stivers, Jr., Leibowitz, Watson, Kressin, Stivers & Erickson,
Knoxville, Tenn., Ben Oshel Bridgers, Holt, Haire & Bridgers, Sylva, N. C., Walter
Echo-Hawk, Kurt Blue Dog, Native American Rights Fund, Boulder, Colo., Ellen
Leitzer, Susan Tomita, National Indian Youth Council, Albuquerque, N. M., for
appellants.
Herbert S. Sanger, Jr., General Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority, James E.
Fox, Justin M. Schwamm, Sr. Asst. General Counsel, Michael R. McElroy,
Knoxville, Tenn., for appellee.
Bruce J. Ennis, American Civil Liberties Union, New York City, Nancy Stearns,
Center for Constitutional Rights, New York City, for amici curiae Nat'l Council of
Churches of Christ in USA, et al.
David H. Getches, University of Colorado, School of Law, Boulder, Colo., Bertram
E. Hirsch, Bellerose, N. Y., Jon Van Dyke, Native Hawaiian Legal Corp., Honolulu,
Hawaii, for amici curiae.
Before LIVELY, KEITH and MERRITT, Circuit Judges.
LIVELY, Circuit Judge.
This appeal requires the court to make a determination of the legal efficacy of a
claim based on the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.[1]
I.
The plaintiffs brought this class action on behalf of "all those present or future
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Cherokee Indians who practice the traditional Cherokee religion and adhere to
Cherokee Indian tradition and culture." The principal relief sought in the
complaint was an injunction to prevent completion and flooding of the Tellico
Dam on the Little Tennessee River in Monroe County, Tennessee. The complaint
alleged that the impoundment created by the dam will cause irreparable injury to
the plaintiffs. This injury will be caused by flooding of the "sacred homeland" of
the plaintiffs along the river, which will result in destruction of "sacred sites,
medicine gathering sites, holy places and cemeteries, [and] will disturb the sacred
balance of the land . . . ." It was further stated that the threatened actions of the
defendant would cause "irreversible loss to the culture and history of the
plaintiffs."
The claim of a constitutional violation based on the Free Exercise Clause was
stated as follows:
. . . the individual named Plaintiffs will suffer injury by the
infringement of their right to worship the religion of their choice in the
manner of their choosing by the destruction of sites which they hold in
reverence and in denial of access to such sites by the Defendant. This
injury will also be suffered by other members of the class which these
individual Plaintiffs represent.
The complaint also contained claims based upon other provisions of the First
Amendment, the Fifth and Ninth Amendments, the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996, the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §
470 et seq. and various laws of the State of Tennessee.
The plaintiffs filed some 25 affidavits with the complaint in support of their
motion for a preliminary injunction. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., together with an
alternative motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. This motion was
accompanied by three affidavits. In a brief in support of its motion for summary
judgment, the defendant asserted that the plaintiffs were estopped to make their
claim and were barred by laches. In their response, the plaintiffs argued that there
were genuine issues of *1161 material fact, particularly with respect to the defense
of laches, and that this was not a proper case for summary judgment.
All issues were fully briefed and the district court heard extensive oral arguments.
Thereafter the court filed a memorandum opinion and entered an order denying
the plaintiffs' motion for injunction and granting the defendant's motion to
dismiss. In its memorandum, the district court concentrated on the religious
freedom arguments and quickly disposed of the other constitutional claims and
those based on statutes. At the outset the district court stated, "The Court
assumes that the land to be flooded is considered sacred to the Cherokee religion
and that active practitioners of that religion would want to make pilgrimages to
this land as a precept of their religion." The court found that the only "coercive
effect" of the impoundment on the plaintiffs' religious beliefs or practices would
consist of preventing access to certain land owned by the government. The district
court then held, "the free exercise clause is not a license in itself to enter property,
government-owned or otherwise, to which religious practitioners have no other
legal right or access." The court stated specifically that it did not reach the
defenses of estoppel and laches. Sequoyah v. TVA, 480 F.Supp. 608
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(E.D.Tenn.1979).
II.
Though the district court granted the motion to dismiss, it is clear from the
transcript and from his memorandum that Judge Taylor considered the various
affidavits which were in the record. Under Rule 12(b) when matters outside the
pleadings are presented to the court, and not excluded, a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim is treated as one for summary judgment. We treat the
decision of the district court as one granting summary judgment. See Compania
De Remorque Y. Salvamento, S. A. v. Esperance, Inc., 187 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1951).
In reviewing summary judgment for the defendant this court must view the entire
record in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Aetna Insurance Co. v.
Loveland Gas & Electric Co., 369 F.2d 648 (6th Cir. 1966); Bohn Aluminum &
Brass Corp. v. Storm King Corp., 303 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1962).
A.
We agree with the holding of the district court that the defendant was entitled to
judgment on the plaintiffs' claim of violation of their right to freedom of speech
and association, to due process and equal protection of the law, and rights
reserved to them by the Ninth Amendment. Accepting all the pleadings and
affidavits as true, no claim for relief was stated with respect to these theories and
the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Relief under the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, the National Historic Preservation Act
and laws of Tennessee is foreclosed by a provision of the Energy and Water
Development Appropriation Bill, Pub. Law No. 96-69, signed by President Carter
on September 25, 1979: "[N]otwithstanding provisions of 16 U.S.C., Chapter 35
[The Endangered Species Act] or any other law, the Corporation [TVA] is
authorized and directed to complete construction, operate and maintain the
Tellico Dam. . . ." (italics supplied). No clearer congressional command is
imaginable. No law is to stand in the way of the completion and operation of the
dam. The only basis upon which the district court or this court would be
empowered to enter an order contrary to the express will of Congress is that a
violation of the Constitution will result from carrying out the congressional
mandate.
B.
Before analyzing the complaint and affidavits of the plaintiffs we note that the
Tellico Dam has engendered controversy and litigation from the time it was first
proposed. A brief description of the Little Tennessee River, the historical
significance of the region and the litigation spawned by Tellico is contained in the
opening paragraphs of the Supreme Court's opinion in the "snail darter" case,
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 156-59, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 2282-84, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978).
*1162 The record in the present case discloses that some of the plaintiffs objected
to the dam and sought to prevent its construction as early as 1965. However, the
documents in the record indicate that the Cherokee objections to the Tellico Dam
were based primarily on a fear that their cultural heritage, rather than their
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religious rights, would be affected by flooding the Little Tennessee Valley. Only
with the filing of the complaint in this action, on October 12, 1979 — less than a
month before impoundment was scheduled to begin — did any Cherokee make an
explicit claim based on the Free Exercise Clause.
C.
The allegations of the complaint which relate to free exercise of religion have been
set forth, ante. Examination of the contents of the affidavits filed by the plaintiffs
discloses the following:
(1) The plaintiff Ammoneta Sequoyah is a medicine man and a direct
descendant of Sequoyah, the inventor of the Cherokee writing system.
This affiant stated that he had gone to the Valley all his life and had
lived in an abandoned cabin at Chota[*] for six years. His ancestor
Sequoyah was born at Tuskegee, another of the Cherokee village sites
in the Valley. The affiant stated that he goes to the Valley three or four
times a year to get medicine which must be gathered by a medicine
man "to work a cure." The Cherokees believe that all a person knows is
placed in the ground with that person when he is buried. Flooding the
Valley or digging up the bodies of Indians buried there will destroy
"the knowledge and beliefs of [the] people who are in the ground" and
destroy what they have taught. Mr. Sequoyah believes he will lose his
knowledge of medicine if the Valley is flooded.
(2) Richard Crowe had been going to the lands at Tellico for more than
30 years and learned from his people that "This is where WE begun."
Over the years Mr. Crowe has visited the area more than 20 times, and
he took his children there when they were young. Chota is one of the
sacred Cherokee places, spoken of by his family as the birthplace of the
Cherokee. It was understood by the Cherokees that "this location was
our connection with the Great Spirit."
(3) Lloyd Sequoyah, brother of the plaintiff Ammoneta Sequoyah, is
also a medicine man. He stated in his affidavit that he had visited the
Valley "on two occasions," and that the only place that he can find his
medicine is where the Cherokee forefathers lived. It was his belief that
"If these lands are flooded they will destroy the spiritual strength of
the Cherokee people."
(4) Robert Blankenship stated, "Chota, and the Little Tennessee River .
. . . are sacred because they are the only two tangible items left for me
and other Cherokee people to worship."
(5) A number of other affidavits described the land in the Little
Tennessee Valley as sacred and holy to Cherokees and stated that
burial sites should not be disturbed.
(6) Several affidavits were filed by anthropologists who specialize in
American Indian studies. These affidavits affirmed the importance of
particular places in Cherokee tradition and religion. They also testified
to the importance of living in harmony with nature and the belief that
interference with natural objects, such as damming rivers, is wrong. All
also testified to the importance of prophecies to traditional Cherokees,
and stated that many of their prophecies rest on oral history of earlier
events in the "Old Country" of North Carolina, Georgia and Tennessee.
D.
The Cherokees who are plaintiffs in this action obviously have great reverence for
*1163 their ancestors and believe that the places where their ancestors lived,
gathered medicines, died and were buried have cultural and religious significance.
Similar feelings are shared by most people to a greater or lesser extent. However,
because of their beliefs respecting the transmission of knowledge and spiritual
powers to succeeding generations, particular geographic locations figure more
prominently in Indian religion and culture than in those of most other people.
III.
There is no requirement that a religion meet any organizational or doctrinal test
in order to qualify for First Amendment protection. Orthodoxy is not an issue. The
fact that Cherokees have no written creeds and no man-made houses of worship
is of no importance. The Cherokees have a religion within the meaning of the
Constitution and the sincerity of the adherence of individual plaintiffs to that
religion is not questioned. However, in bringing this action, the plaintiffs are
asserting that otherwise lawful and wholly secular activity of the government
should be prohibited. Accepting every statement of fact as true, the question is
whether the plaintiffs have shown a constitutionally cognizable infringement of a
First Amendment right.
It is the flooding of a particular place which is claimed to deny the right freely to
exercise the plaintiffs' religion. It is clear, even from the plaintiffs' affidavits, that
the exact location of Chota and the other village sites was unknown to the
Cherokees until TVA undertook archeological explorations with the assistance of
the University of Tennessee. It appears that the plaintiffs are now claiming that
the entire Valley is sacred. Yet none of the affidavits stated this explicitly. For
more than 100 years prior to its acquisition by TVA the land in the Valley was
owned by persons other than the plaintiffs or members of the class. There is no
showing that any Cherokees other than Ammoneta Sequoyah and Richard Crowe
ever went to the area for religious purposes during that time. At most, plaintiffs
showed that a few Cherokees had made expeditions to the area, prompted for the
most part by an understandable desire to learn more about their cultural heritage.
IV.
Two recent Supreme Court cases establish a two-step analysis in which courts
should engage when deciding a Free Exercise claim. First, it must be determined
whether the governmental action does in fact create a burden on the exercise of
the plaintiffs' religion. If a burden is found it must be balanced against the
governmental interest, with the government being required to show an overriding
or compelling reason for its action. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03,
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83 S.Ct. 1790, 1792-93, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
214-15, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1532-33, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). The first step in this analysis
is described in Yoder as evaluating the "quality of the claims" alleged to be
religious. 406 U.S. at 215, 92 S.Ct. at 1533.
Many of the reported decisions concerning Indian religious claims offer little help
because they arose in entirely different factual contexts from that of the present
case.[2] In the one reported case which is similar to the present one, individual
Navajo Indians and three Navajo "Chapters" claimed that the waters of Lake
Powell encroached upon their ancestral worship site within the Rainbow Bridge
National Monument in Utah. The district court granted summary judgment for
the government defendants on two grounds: (1) the fact that the plaintiffs had no
property interest in the Monument was held to deprive them of a cognizable First
Amendment claim; (2) if the plaintiffs were found to have a cognizable claim,
when the opposing interests were balanced those of the defendants were found to
out-weigh *1164 those of the plaintiffs. Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F.Supp. 641
(D.C.Utah 1977), appeal pending, No. 78-1517 (10th Cir.).
The district court in the present case based its holding on the plaintiffs' lack of any
property interest in the Tellico area. 480 F.Supp. at 612. While this is a factor to
be considered, we feel it should not be conclusive in view of the history of the
Cherokee expulsion from Southern Appalachia followed by the "Trail of Tears" to
Oklahoma and the unique nature of the plaintiffs' religion. Nevertheless, there are
criteria by which the constitutional validity of a claim based on the Free Exercise
Clause must be tested. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, the Supreme Court found
that the religious faith and the mode of life of the Amish are "inseparable and
interdependent," and that "the traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a
matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an
organized group, and intimately related to daily living." 406 U.S. at 215-16, 92
S.Ct. at 1533. In Frank v. Alaska, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979), the Supreme
Court of Alaska reversed the conviction of an Athabascan Indian who had been
found guilty of violating game laws when he killed a moose for a funeral feast, or
potlatch. The court found that "[t]he funeral potlatch is the most important
institution in Athabascan life" and that "[f]ood is the cornerstone of the ritual."
604 P.2d at 1071. "While moose itself is not sacred, it is needed for proper
observance of a sacred ritual which must take place soon after death occurs.
Moose is the centerpiece of the most important ritual in Athabascan life and is the
equivalent of sacred symbols in other religions." Id. at 1073 (footnotes deleted). In
People v. Woody, 61 Cal.2d 716, 40 Cal.Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964), the
hallucinogenic drug peyote was found to play a central role in the ceremony and
practice of the Native American Church, an organization of American Indians. The
"meeting" ceremony, involving the use of peyote, was found to comprise the
cornerstone of the religion. Peyote was found to be more than a sacrament; it was
itself an object of worship. "[P]rohibition of the use of peyote results in a virtual
inhibition of the practice of defendants' religion. To forbid the use of peyote is to
remove the theological heart of Peyotism." 40 Cal.Rptr. at 73-74, 394 P.2d at 817-
18.
Examination of the plaintiffs' affidavits discloses no such claim of centrality or
indispensability of the Little Tennessee Valley to Cherokee religious observances.
Granting as we do that the individual plaintiffs sincerely adhere to a religion
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which honors ancestors and draws its spiritual strength from feelings of kinship
with nature, they have fallen short of demonstrating that worship at the particular
geographic location in question is inseparable from the way of life (Yoder), the
cornerstone of their religious observance (Frank), or plays the central role in their
religious ceremonies and practices (Woody). Rather, the affidavits disclose that
medicines are obtainable there which may be found at higher elevations in other
locations, that it is believed by some that the knowledge of previous generations
will be lost if graves are disturbed or flooded and that the locations of Chota and
other village sites are sacred places. These affidavits appear to demonstrate
"personal preference" rather than convictions "shared by an organized group."
Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at 216, 92 S.Ct. at 1533. When the affidavits are
"indulgently treated," Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corp. v. Storm King Corp., supra,
303 F.2d at 427, at most they establish a feeling by the individual affiants that the
general location of the dam and impoundment has a religious significance which
will be destroyed by the flooding. The claim of centrality of the Valley to the
practice of the traditional Cherokee religion, as required by Yoder, Woody and
Frank, is missing from this case. The overwhelming concern of the affiants
appears to be related to the historical beginnings of the Cherokees and their
cultural development. It is damage to tribal and family folklore and traditions,
more than particular religious observances, which appears to be at stake. The
complaint asserts an "irreversible loss to the *1165 culture and history of the
plaintiffs." Though cultural history and tradition are vitally important to any
group of people, these are not interests protected by the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment.
It is a difficult and sensitive determination. However, we have looked at "the
quality of the claims," as required by Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at 215, 92 S.Ct. at
1533, and conclude that plaintiffs have not alleged infringement of a
constitutionally cognizable First Amendment right. In the absence of such an
infringement, there is no need to balance the opposing interest of the parties or to
determine whether the government's interest in proceeding with its plans for the
Tellico Dam is "compelling."
V.
The plaintiffs have urged this court to remand to the district court for a trial.
However, at the hearing on the motions the district court particularly asked what
issues would require a trial, given the affidavits filed by the parties. Counsel for
the plaintiffs emphasized the need for further proof in order for the district court
to pass on the defense of laches and estoppel and in balancing the competing
claims, assuming a finding of infringement. Neither the district court nor this
court found it necessary to reach these issues. No argument was made that further
proof was required to establish the required quality of the claims. When asked at
oral argument in this court, counsel for the plaintiffs was unable to state what
further proof was required. It is our conclusion, for the reasons set forth, that the
defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P.
Nor is it necessary to remand because we have decided the case for reasons
somewhat different from those stated by the district court. The grounds of our
decision are supported by the record and the parties have fully briefed and argued
these grounds. See Paskaly v. Seale, 506 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1974).
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The judgment of the district court is affirmed. No costs allowed on appeal.
MERRITT, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I agree with the centrality standard and the general reasoning of the Court's
opinion, but I believe the case should be remanded to the District Court to permit
plaintiffs to offer proof concerning the centrality of their ancestral burial grounds
to their religion.
This is a confusing and essentially uncharted area of law under the free exercise
clause. At the time the complaint and various affidavits were filed, the centrality
standard had not been clearly articulated. It may have been unclear to the
Cherokees precisely what they had to allege and prove in order to make a
constitutional claim. Indeed, the District Court simply held that the Indians have
no free exercise claim because the Government now owns the land on which the
burial sites are located. The District Court therefore did not explore, develop or
find any facts concerning the role that this particular location plays in the
Cherokee religion. In view of the liberal rules of pleading and the protective
attitude that federal courts should follow in considering Indian claims,[1] we
should reverse and remand the case to the District Court in order to give the
Cherokees an opportunity to offer proof concerning the significance and centrality
of their ancestral burial grounds in light of the standard we have adopted.
[1] "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; . . . ."
[*] Chota was one of the nine sites of 18th Century Cherokee villages located in the Valley. Chota was
perhaps the most important of these; it was both the capital of the Cherokee Nation and a "peace
town" or sanctuary.
[2] Typically they concern some official regulation of individual activity which infringes the right of a
particular group or person to the free exercise of religion. E. g., Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th
Cir. 1975) (prison regulation against long, braided hair).
[1] See, e. g., United States v. Jackson, 280 U.S. 183, 190, 50 S.Ct. 143, 145, 74 L.Ed. 361 (1930);
United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 597, 36 S.Ct. 696, 697, 60 L.Ed. 1192 (1916); United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384, 6 S.Ct. 1109, 1114, 30 L.Ed. 228 (1886).
